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By Michael Knezevic
Kyrgyzstan is one of Central Asia’s poorest countries; its economy is dominated by agriculture, mineral extraction and remittances sent home from the one million citizens working abroad, primarily in Russia. The nation of six million people has been historically plagued with chronic political unrest and revolution, all the while grappling with endemic corruption.
This year, chaotic 4th October parliamentary elections precipitated riots and significant political upheaval. They were consequently annulled and new elections are scheduled for an unspecified date in mid-2021. The man who emerged as acting president Sadyr Japarov called for new presidential elections on the 10th January. On the same day, a referendum will be held on constitutional reforms which would re-centralise power in the office of the president, threatening a democratic backslide. The difference in these elections’ unrest is that organised crime – a staple of Kyrgyz politics since its Soviet days – has emerged from the shadows and faced scrutiny from investigative journalists and the Kyrgyz people.
Kyrgyz politics
Infighting and even violence are an inescapable feature of the Kyrgyz political class. A lack of established political parties with coherent policies means that partisan allegiance is rare and instead representatives move between parties to further their individual standing. Despite this, political pluralism and activism among its citizens have seen Kyrgyzstan described as Central Asia’s ‘Island of Democracy’ – surrounded by a sea of one-party states and dictators-for-life. As time goes on, however, the people’s willingness to protest becomes less a sign of democratic expression, but rather an indictment of the government’s perpetually corrupt institutions.
The current 2010 constitution diluted the sizable power of the president by introducing a one-term limit and creating a strong parliament – the previous two presidents Akayev and Bakiyev had been ousted in revolutions. Before stepping down to run in this month’s presidential election, then-acting president and current frontrunner Sadyr Japarov unveiled a new draft constitution on 17th November 2020.
The new draft constitution would once again concentrate power in the hands of the president, adding a new body to oversee and feasibly constrain the elected parliament already in place. Presidential pre-eminence and a discrepancy between the Kyrgyz and Russian language versions regarding presidential term limits have raised fears of an authoritarian shift. Moreover, a ban on anything that contravenes the vaguely-put “generally recognised moral values and the traditions of the people of Kyrgyzstan” concerns human rights activists. The ban could license authorities to increase censorship and carry out crackdowns over sensitive issues such as ethnic tensions between Kyrgyzstan’s Kyrgyz and Uzbek populations.
Sadyr Japarov: Adversary or enabler of the corrupt?
Sadyr Japarov had been serving a ten-year prison sentence for attempting to incite a coup and kidnapping charges before he was sprung from prison during the riots which followed October’s parliamentary elections. Having escaped from prison, he managed to become prime minister, force then-president Sooronbay Jeenbekov’s resignation and assume the post of acting president in just ten days.
However, Eurasia Analyst at AKE International Christopher Jolliffe notes the “growing concern” around a Japarov-led government’s impact on the economically crucial mining sector’s regulatory climate. Japarov’s outspoken opposition and plans to nationalise the Canadian-owned Kumtor gold mine, in particular, could disrupt the country’s business environment and discourage foreign investment. Nonetheless, Japarov’s fervent nationalism and campaign against the mine has painted him as a man of the people and consequently bolstered his genuine popularity. A Central Asia Barometer public opinion poll conducted between the 9th and 17th of December, revealed that 64% of respondents would have voted for Japarov if the elections were held the following day, while 40% deemed “political instability” to be the country’s most critical problem.
Although he enjoys popular support, a number of other factors have placed Japarov in good stead for the upcoming elections. For instance, his campaign is greatly outspending its rivals at 44 million Kyrgyz soms (approximately US$628,000), seven times higher than the next biggest spender Babyrjan Tolbaev. Japarov is already being investigated for using ‘administrative resources’ in his campaign. Furthermore, Japarov – already the favourite of 18 candidates – finds himself at the top of the ballot paper after an ostensibly randomised allocation process.
Critics also argue that Japarov is connected to members of organised crime families, undermining his anti-corruption platform. His supporters are reportedly harassing political and civil society figures as well as competitors such as opposition leader Adakhan Madumarov, echoing reports from October’s parliamentary elections. On 4th January, the Central Election Commission (BShK) announced it was investigating allegations of voter intimidation in the Osh region. An NGO reported that a group of young men had gone from house to house, demanding that residents vote for Japarov on the 10th. Moreover, while Japarov was serving as head of the Nurneftegaz oil refinery until 2005, the company was accused of corporate tax evasion. He would go on to be an anti-corruption advisor to former president Kurmanbek Bakiyev after the 2005 revolution, during which time he allegedly concealed corruption amongst the political elite. One such instance saw Bakiyev’s son launder money in the Issyk-Kul Investment Bank – headed by Japarov’s sister Raikul Japarova. Japarov’s meteoric rise from prisoner to president has raised questions about ongoing criminal ties.
The Matraimov affair
The Matraimov family is among the wealthiest in Kyrgyzstan, and accordingly affords substantial political influence. The Mekenim Kyrgyzstan party’s unexpected finish as runner-up in the parliamentary elections was widely considered a product of mail-in voter fraud via the infamously corruptible and since-banned Form No. 2, as well as allegations of vote-buying by the Matraimovs. Mekenim Kyrgyzstan won 40% of the seats in parliament and stoked riots which resulted in 1,218 people being injured and one death. Amid the post-election chaos, organised crime groups reportedly made threats against the interim government, with thugs taking to the streets and internet trolls deployed online.
As Japarov looked to deliver on his promise of a crackdown on organised crime and consolidate his sudden but precarious rise to power, authorities detained oligarch and former deputy head of Kyrgyzstan’s National Customs Service Raimbek Matraimov. On 20th October, he was arrested for abusing his former office as a Customs deputy to orchestrate a smuggling and money-laundering operation worth US$700m. Whistle-blower Aerken Saimati was assassinated in Istanbul just months after revealing that he had been made to transfer the funds out of Kyrgyzstan between 2011 and 2016, some testimony allegedly implicates Matraimov in the murder.
Shortly after his detention, however, Matraimov was placed under house arrest on condition of cooperation with the investigation and the payment of damages worth US$24.6m to the state – a move which drew scepticism from the public. Japarov spoke out in favour of the deal, claiming that imprisoning Matraimov would not be conducive to recovering the funds. However, Japarov never explained why Matraimov – who maintains his innocence – was due to pay back the money given the absence of any formal charges being brought against him. The day after Matraimov’s arrest, Japarov proposed an economic amnesty for individuals with illegally obtained financial assets which was passed a month later. Critics believe the legislation’s timing and hasty preparation suggests it is an attempt to avoid a conviction of Matraimov.
The Abdukadyrs, a secretive Uighur clan worth hundreds of millions of dollars, were also implicated in the money-laundering case, having systematically paid massive bribes to the Kyrgyz customs service. A separate investigation revealed that the Abdukadyr clan also has a joint investment with Uulkan Turgunova, Matraimov’s wife, in Dubai real estate. The US Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan Donald Lu described investigations into the Matraimov family as the ‘single most important’ story of the past 18 months, superseding chaotic parliamentary elections and the COVID-19 pandemic. He praised investigative media outlets and social media journalists for exposing the extent of organised criminal networks and bringing them into the public discourse.
Meanwhile, the political class failed to take convictive action against Matraimov. In November, Japarov stepped down as acting president in order to officially compete in the upcoming January election, appointing his ally Talant Mamytov as a placeholder. Mamytov had led the government’s investigation into Matraimov’s smuggling operation, but failed to mention his name once in the 24-page report, instead denouncing the investigative journalists involved. Open-source documents also revealed that Mamytov hired the brother of Matraimov’s wife as an aide, though he was consequently dismissed once the family ties were made public. Others among Japarov’s high-ranking allies – including the Prosecutor General – also defended Matraimov. While the US Treasury Department added Matraimov and his wife to the Magnitsky Act sanctions list on the 9th and 11th December respectively, at home, the Matraimov family remains intertwined with the political elite.
Competition from Kamchy?
Kamchybek “Kamchy” Kolbayev is another individual who finds himself on the US Treasury’s Specially Designated Nationals list since 2012 and wields significant political influence from the underground. Kolbayev was reportedly crowned as a ‘thief-in-law’ – a group of globally-operating criminal kingpins from across the former Soviet Union who pledge allegiance to each other and abide by a policy of non-cooperation with law enforcement – in Moscow in 2008.
Recent testimony alleges that Kolbayev may have assisted in generating the unrest which brought Japarov to power. Some lawmakers who voted Japarov into the office of Prime Minister asserted that they were blackmailed to do so, referencing Kolbayev by name. The security services’ historically soft approach to the notorious figure could corroborate the theory that Kolbayev wields influence over political and official circles.
Nevertheless, Kolbayev is currently in prison after being arrested at a Bishkek gym on 22nd October, two days after Matraimov. Many Kyrgyz citizens – including former senior security official Keneshbek Duyshebayev – suspect that the operation, which saw armoured vehicles and rifle-wielding troops detain an unphased Kolbayev, was staged. Like Matraimov, he is likely to be released once the public’s attention is shifted. His previous stints in jail have been defined by prison-breaks, dropped charges and early releases.
Prior to recent reports, opinion was divided over whether Kolbayev and Matraimov – both of whom feasibly wield more power than the president – were allies or rivals. Matraimov was earning an official salary of little over US$1,000 per month when journalists uncovered his wife Uulkan Turgunova’s social media presence. Photos detailing trips to luxury resorts around the world were replaced by lavish staycations in Kyrgyzstan during the pandemic. Investigators identified one plot on the shores of Lake Issyk-Kul as an elite members-only resort owned by the notorious Kolbayev. This discovery supported the assassinated whistle-blower’s claim that Kolbayev was Matraimov’s ‘partner and protector’.
Kyrgyz citizen Bakyt (name changed to protect anonymity) notes that corruption remains pervasive at all levels of society, from the President’s office to the traffic police. Until investigators establish a platform which reaches into the unquestioning and largely uneducated provinces, one can only dream of elections untainted by vote-buying and intimidation. Yet, Bakyt finds hope in the public’s appetite for the recent flurry of corruption investigations, saying society must rally around the reporters if it is to expose the ingrained corruption.
Political prospects
Japarov’s relative popularity and the widespread distrust of other politicians will likely result in his assuming the presidency, entrenching his authority through reforms that will see the president wield more power than any of his predecessors since the 2010 revolution. Routine unrest is likely to follow a constitutional consolidation of presidential power and Japarov’s treatment of organised crime could prove decisive in whether he joins the tradition of presidents ousted by revolutions. On the other hand, a firm stance against organised crime could also curtail his tenure in a far less democratic manner.
Christopher Jolliffe suggests that for Matraimov and Kolbayev, gaining influence over Japarov is seen as a ‘means to maintain the status quo, where state-linked corruption is increasingly becoming the norm’. The real risk, he argues, will be in the long-term, as these powerful figures compete for political influence. In the short-term, Matraimov and Kolbayev’s continually unbridled operations could generate new unrest in Bishkek. However, Japarov’s seemingly performative detentions of Matraimov and Kolbayev, alongside his virtually non-existent campaign against corruption while holding office, dashes short-lived hopes that the new government’s anti-corruption rhetoric could materialise into policy.
Bakyt laments that the lawmakers themselves ‘used to be crooks’ and for now at least, the former Soviet state, like them, is ‘stuck in the 90s’ – a time where instability allowed organised crime to rule by violence, extortion and corruption.
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