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By Niccolo Balducci
The past four years have seen some of the lowest points of US-European relations in decades. Donald Trump’s “America First” foreign policy manifested itself in the form of incessant diplomatic squabbles, cutbacks of U.S. military presence in geopolitically vulnerable NATO states and an abandonment of collective efforts aimed at curbing climate change. As a result of this, it is not surprising that numerous European nations have increasingly been voicing their scepticism about the fate of the transatlantic partnership as of late. With President Biden highlighting his commitment to restoring the internationalist outlook of American foreign policy, it remains to be seen whether the concerns of these leaders will be vindicated.
Probably the biggest indication of the transatlantic partnership’s continued resilience has been the President’s immediate decision to rejoin the Paris Climate Agreement. Top E.U. officials, including Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, have expressed jubilance in response to the White House’s decision. This is unsurprising. For one, numerous Northern European countries, most notably the Netherlands and Denmark, are particularly susceptible to flooding. Curbing the emissions of one of the largest CO2 producers in the world will buy these states a few more years to prepare for rises in sea levels. Less obvious is the boon this will provide to European industries currently in competition with U.S.-based firms. With emission checks inevitably comes a degree of reduction in economic productivity, once again placing private entities on either side of the Atlantic on equal footing. Vehicle and heavy machinery manufacturers especially, the principle sources of E.U. exports to America, should breathe a sigh of relief.
Just as encouraging has been Biden’s reaffirmed commitment to the NATO alliance. The organisation underwent some of its most notable internal crises under the Trump presidency, stemming in large part from the administration’s unwillingness to help subsidise European defence budgets. Russia’s Western neighbours should be relieved, as another Republican term would have all but solidified the need to increase spending to meet NATO requirements. A Biden administration less sympathetic to the Kremlin and less willing to risk the fate of key alliances over monetary issues is all they could ask for. Nevertheless, it would be ill-advised for Europeans to fully reverse spending commitments made during the Trump administration, as this would likely be used as a rallying cry for isolationist Republicans.
With all this being noted, America’s telegraphed return into the limelight of international politics has not been welcomed wholeheartedly in Europe. Indeed, the Trump presidency has solidified the need for a stronger, more self-sufficient bloc in the minds of numerous leaders of the Old Continent. America’s initial exodus from the Paris Climate Agreement was in fact shortly followed by the proposition and implementation of The European Green Deal. This is a project of considerable ambition which seeks to slash CO2 emissions within the E.U. to zero by 2050, solidifying the bloc’s newfound diplomatic capabilities and autonomy in the process. Biden’s perceived one-upmanship has thus hurt Brussels’ pride, as there are concerns that the amount of resources America seems willing to invest into its climate plans will outshine the continent’s best efforts. Consequently, Europe would find itself playing second fiddle yet again, something the E.U.’s higher-ups are increasingly fed up with.
The Trump administration also brought about the more important realisation that relying on the whims and personality of America’s president for European defence is an unreliable long-term strategy. In this sense, the extent to which President Biden commits the U.S. to upholding and supporting NATO is irrelevant. Instead, there is a strong possibility that European nations start taking the long-touted suggestion of an E.U. army more seriously. Indeed, the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy, a framework enabling the bloc to conduct humanitarian interventions, demonstrates that the more influential nations of the continent hunger for a degree of military autonomy from the US. At this rate, it would take several successive pro-NATO U.S. administrations coming to power to ease the anxieties of Europeans and ensure the continued survival of the organisation. Given the current and likely long-term influence of Trumpism on the Republican party, however, this seems unlikely.
These issues of trust, however, do not entirely stem from the arguably warped perspective of the European bloc; in terms of international trade, President Biden’s administration seems hesitant to fully return to the status quo. This can explicitly be seen in the Boeing-Airbus dispute, which saw the U.S. and E.U. impose tariffs on each other after accusing one another of illegally subsidising their respective aeroplane manufacturers. Indeed, whereas the bloc was quick to invite the new administration to a new round of negotiations aimed at brokering a settlement, President Biden has been stalling. This impasse inevitably caused some E.U. leaders to question the sincerity of Washington’s foreign policy mantra and is likely to incite further diplomatic scuffles in the future if left unaddressed.
Overall, the fate of the transatlantic partnership hangs in the balance. Whilst President Biden may have brought back conventional internationalist elements of U.S. foreign policy, this has not been consistent. All the while, European countries are sceptical about embracing a domineering U.S. with open arms after the bloc’s surge in diplomatic autonomy during the Trump years. The Old and New Continents will likely maintain a cordial, if uneasy alliance as long as Moscow and Beijing continue to present geopolitical and financial threats. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that the E.U. has been moving away from the U.S. sphere of influence for some time now, and it will take some serious diplomatic acumen on America’s part to halt this drift.
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