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Libya: a conflict continuing in the shadows of Covid-19

  • Writer: The Eyes Journal
    The Eyes Journal
  • Jul 16, 2020
  • 5 min read

Updated: Jul 29, 2020

By Hazel Laurenson

 

By L'Amico del Popolo

Smoke rises from the port of the eastern Libyan city of Benghazi on February 14, 2015, during clashes between forces loyal to the internationally recognised government and Islamist militias.


Whilst much of the world is currently preoccupied with fighting Covid-19, in some regions, the virus is yet another enemy which has been laid on top of pre-existing crises. The Libyan Civil War, which has been painfully lacking in coverage by the Western media, is one such example. Calls for peace from the United Nations have, admittedly, increased during the pandemic, but this should not detract from the fact that coronavirus and its immediate global ramifications have been seen by some factions on the ground as an exploitable opportunity.


The Second Libyan Civil War erupted in 2014 but grew out of pre-existing bad blood and tensions. It has predominantly centred around the warring groups of the House of Representatives (HoR), and the UN-recognised Government of National Accord (GNA). Since its outbreak, however, numerous other parties have become involved, to the extent that describing the hostile situation as a ‘civil war’ is, in itself, open to debate. Meddling foreign powers include Turkey, Egypt, Russia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and numerous domestic militias have also asserted loyalties. Additionally, an East-West divide has emerged in Libya, with Turkey establishing a sphere of influence in the West, and Russia in the East. In the summer of 2019, there was an influx of mercenaries to the country, and Russian-made aircraft were deployed to Eastern Libya. Then, earlier this year, increased military support from Turkey resulted in a significant shift of power on the ground as Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s (commander of the Tobruk-based Libyan National Army) campaign on Tripoli was pushed back.


‘Khalifa Haftar’ by МИД России

Haftar was appointed by the HoR as commander-in-chief of the Libyan National Army (LNA) in March 2015 to restore its sovereignty over Libya. For a long time, he has been coordinating an encroachment upon the city of Tripoli, where the GNA has been based. The capture of Tripoli in the name of the HoR has thus become a dream for Haftar, one which can now be described as having failed. The destruction which will be wrought as a result of this failure is yet to become clear, but one thing that it clear is that its magnitude will be substantial. The context of the global pandemic adds to the lack of clarity regarding how the unstable and toxic environment produced by this development will play out in the long-term. Reports based on leaked UN documents state that Haftar’s recent actions have heightened the state of chaos in Libya further still. They outline that he has employed foreign mercenaries to intercept shipments of weapons from Turkey to the GNA and its allies. This secret mission, described as ‘Project Opus’, was ultimately unsuccessful. Nevertheless, it is of particular significance as it allegedly involved members of the RAF and Royal Marines, as well as military personnel from Australia, France, Malta, South Africa, and the USA. By demonstrating the subterfuge and meddling with the War is rife, this episode further testifies to the increasing reach and intricacy of the War as it continues to evolve.


A notable increase in the magnitude of danger has arisen in tandem with the War’s expansion of scope. As a result of escalation, in terms of diplomacy and ground forces, the future of Libya has become more and more dependent upon the actions of the international community, arguably irrevocably so. Lacking clear unity at the grassroots level, due to the context of decades of violent ruptures and dislocation, Libya’s popular morale for resistance is unsurprisingly low. This setting makes the political condition ripe for external manipulation, and thus it can be seen as an example of yet another indigenous conflict which has been exploited by outsiders to serve their independent motives. The UAE, for instance, is concerned with Libya’s future due to its access to oil and the geopolitical implications of this. In overtly and covertly propping up Haftar, the chances of robust political foundations emerging in Libya are minimised, thus the UAE are essentially safeguarding their hegemony in terms of oil. With much of the world distracted by Covid-19, interventions can increase further, and penetrate deeper. This is largely because governments which one might expect to oppose such moves are focussed upon domestic policies and public opinions relating to issues closer to home.


On a similar note, there are further common historical themes at play here. These include the drastic misunderstanding by intervening outside powers of the underlying indigenous forces and sentiments. In the Libyan context, labelling actors and groups as ‘Islamist’, for instance, might be useful when first developing an understanding of the conflict, but is largely superficial for analytical study. Factions within Libya are not only aware of this outside tendency to categorise but seek to exploit it as a weapon to legitimise political violence, making large groups of people prone to persecution.


It may be far from clear which party will emerge victorious in the Civil War, but it can be stated with certainty that Libyan civilians have lost by a long way. This fact is not a new phenomenon, as the Libyan people have been caught in the crossfire - literally and metaphorically - for years. Recently, Hanan Salah – a senior investigator and researcher in human rights abuses in Libya – has emphasised this in her work, and questioned the sincerity of international calls for a ceasefire. Even in the context of a global medical emergency, patronage from external powers has not stopped, and firm international pressure to de-escalate the conflict is absent. In light of this, ground forces and commanders see little reason to alter their course of action.


The main civilian killer has been air and drone strikes, which target civilian infrastructure situated in close proximity to military facilities. The destruction of schools and hospitals is especially concerning due to Covid-19 and the subsequent need for functioning healthcare facilities to attend to the vulnerable and suffering. No party has openly taken responsibility for the attacks, but the United Nations suspects Libyan-Arab forces. Condemnation, however, does not go nearly far enough. It is vital that this indiscriminate civilian killing - taking place not wholly beneath the international radar, but not attracting the attention it deserves - ends. Given the collapse of the national Libyan justice system, and the international criminal court being slow to investigate, the lack of deterrents for war crimes in this context is seriously worrying. Given Covid-19’s ramifications, it is unlikely that the international criminal court will speed up its enquiries anytime soon. Hanan Salah’s views are again relevant here. She has highlighted the risks posed to both the national and international community in light of the fact that Libya is currently an accountability-free zone, as lawlessness reaps chaos.


Political landscapes that are polarised to extremes seldom exist in tandem with stable nations, and Libya is certainly no exception. Currently, international eyes are largely averted from the stark humanitarian crisis in Libya, with exceptions being granted to immediate patrons. Highlighting this international blinkered vision is not intended to belittle the severity of the coronavirus pandemic and the attention it requires from national governments. Contrarily, the point has been to allude to how fortunate such nations - for whom the pandemic is the only major crisis at hand - are. For actors within the Libyan conflict, coronavirus is somewhat acting as a shield, behind which all manners of indiscriminate war crimes are taking place.


 

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