Navalny’s return: A Russian Revolution?

By Hazel Laurenson

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Oppositionist Alexei Navalny looks up into the sky on a march (29th February 2020) in memory of politician Boris Nemtsov, who was killed in Russia.

It is still too early to predict how the mid-and long-term impacts of the events of the past month will manifest in Russia. What is certain, however, is that there will be change. It has been optimistically suggested that there is reason to hope that this will take the form of reform and a shift in Russia’s global outlook under new leadership. This is rooted in the fact that Putin has no obvious successor and his backing is largely grounded in an older generation of dying oligarchs. In contrast, Navalny has a support network across Russia and has set out his aspirations for a better future. On the other hand, it is also extremely possible that change will take the form of increased repression and surveillance in a society that already resembles an Orwellian nightmare.

After Alexei Navalny’s poisoning last year and subsequent recovery in Germany, he has now made a surprising return to Moscow on 17th January, which represented a public undermining of Vladimir Putin’s near-dictatorial authority. Whilst 2020 somewhat went Putin’s way, it appears that Navalny is likely to receive substantial national and international attention in 2021. On 1st July last year, Putin and his cadre of cronies pushed through a new ‘Basic Law’, permitting Putin to run again for the presidency in 2024 and 2030. Due to the coronavirus-induced chaos and confusion which wreaked worldwide havoc – and which continues to do so – immediate reactions to the Law were relatively nondescript; international actors had bigger fish to fry. Putin also appointed yes-men to regional and federal positions in 2020, further reinforcing his status as ‘National Leader’. It is significant, however, that these status-entrenching efforts are indicative of a deep sense of vulnerability on Putin’s part: he is not only aware but afraid of the threat Navalny poses to the security of his regime.

Navalny’s criticism of Putin is not new: he has spoken out against the despot for many years. Other individuals who have openly opposed Putin in the past have, one way or another, been removed from Russia’s public stage. Gary Kasparov, for instance, took up residence in Croatia, where he has recently been naturalised as a citizen, whilst Boris Nemtsov met an uglier fate when he was shot outside the Kremlin in 2015. Putin’s attempt to get rid of Navalny last summer, however, was, as we know, unsuccessful. Navalny has since described Putin as “Vladimir the Poisoner of Underpants”, given the President’s instruction for Russian intelligence to place the deadly nerve agent Novichok on the inner seams of his underwear when he was touring Siberia. Putin’s renewed aggravation at the man who has become a symbol of alternative government and hope for the future is undoubtedly rooted in the fact that Navalny has not been ‘broken’ by his go-to methods of brutal repression and intimidation. Rather, Navalny has bravely continued to speak out, recently describing the unjustifiable display of wealth that is ‘Putin’s palace’ on YouTube, as well as the corruption that plagues the current administration.

It is worth noting at this stage that the nature of Navalny’s politics is contested. Having been born in 1976, he is part of a generation that grew up in the USSR, but which has not been defined by it. Whilst some have labelled him as nationalist, his supporters disagree with this categorisation. Moreover, Navalny has recently taken on a more pro-European and democratic stance, but has not abandoned his anti-migrant rhetoric. Arguably, however, this is irrelevant. His views may be dubious by certain standards in some areas, but this does not detract from his calls for transparent elections and other freedoms, which place him above Putin in many regards.

Navalny was immediately arrested upon his arrival in Moscow from Berlin in January, and subsequently transported to the Matrosskaya Tishina prison. The decision to return to Russia was itself a bold statement, in line with Navalny’s record of publicly challenging Putin. Provoking a response was arguably precisely Navalny’s intention, part of his broader attempt to gain the undivided attention of the international community. The official justification for the arrest is that, whilst in Germany, he violated the conditions of a suspended sentence from 6 years ago for embezzlement which required him to report regularly to Russian police, regardless of whether or not he was in a coma. This absurd episode goes some way to explaining the popular unrest which has since erupted. However, the arrest can more accurately be seen as a spark. The underlying cause of the agitation can instead be identified as the widespread and deep popular hostility towards Putin - a result of Russian citizenry’s grievances for which they rightly hold Putin personally responsible. The protests of 31st January were characterised by a popular cry for freedom, and the scale of the dissent outside of Moscow was far greater than that of any previous demonstrations. The crowds included liberals and academics, but also working-class Russians, and the protestors in the city of Yakutsk continued their unrest despite temperatures of -50° C.

Unsurprisingly, the Russian government’s response to its citizens’ demands for a decent society, not characterised by manipulation and misconduct, has been violence. Police have been filmed beating protestors in Moscow, where, as of 2nd February, over 850 have been detained. These actions have received international condemnation from many statesmen, including the UK Foreign Secretary, German Foreign Minister and US Secretary of State. What real impact, however, will these statements have, if they are not supported by firm policies? We have all witnessed the dangers of globalisation over the past year, as Covid-19 rampaged across the world. Foreign politicians are acutely aware of the limited extent to which they can vocalise opposition to the Russian regime, due to fear of retaliation from Russia which their societies and economies simply would not be able to cope with.

As previously stated, what these events mean for Russia’s future is currently conjecture. It is unclear how, with Russia’s champion of freedom imprisoned – for what is, in reality, an indefinite period of time – those vying for reform will maintain their momentum. Given the sad unlikelihood of policy commitments from international powers, it looks as though the force for change will have to be bottom-up if it is to endure beyond this tough contemporary climate and develop into a system of increased accountability and transparency.

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