Pardons in Venezuela: a road to democracy?

By Noah Merrin

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On Monday 31 August, the Venezuelan government announced that 110 people charged by the state would be pardoned by decree of the country’s president, Nicolás Maduro. 50 of these pardons will be granted to members of opposition parties, charged in politically motivated cases. The Venezuelan government frames this as an act of political goodwill. But, between the twists and turns of Venezuela’s labyrinthine politics, is the latest step relevant?

What is happening in Venezuela?

In January 2019, Juan Guaidó, the leader of an opposition party, declared himself President of Venezuela. His proclamation followed a 2018 presidential election, widely considered to have been fraudulently won by Nicolás Maduro, president since 2013. Guaidó gained recognition as president from over 50 countries, including the EU and the USA. However, since then Maduro has clung to power, weathering out the proceeding international diplomatic storm.

Left: Henrique Capriles, former presidential candidate and leader of Primero Justicia. Right: Juan Guaidó, self-declared president and leader of Voluntad Popular. Source: Getty Images/BBC

Why does Venezuela matter?

Since Maduro took power in 2013, the Venezuelan economy has contracted by over 60%. Over 90% of Venezuelans now live in poverty. Food shortages have created near-famine conditions. Consequently, over 5 million Venezuelans have left the country since 2015. In addition to unimaginable human suffering, the Venezuelan refugee crisis is a cause of huge instability across Central and South America, as well as the Caribbean. Integrating millions of refugees has made it more difficult for surrounding nations to deal with endemic issues such as gang conflict, economic decline, and undocumented migrants.

The National Assembly elections and democratic backsliding

According to Guaidó and his US allies, the recent pardons are a token act designed to legitimise the upcoming elections to the National Assembly (Venezuela’s parliament), which they believe will be rigged in favour of Maduro’s United Socialist Party (PSUV). This idea carries weight. Maduro’s regime has not underwritten the pardons with any democratic reform. In fact, on 12 June 2020, the government-controlled Supreme Court unilaterally appointed members to the five-person board of the National Electoral Council (CNE), the supposedly independent body responsible for ensuring the transparency of polls. Meanwhile, the G4, a group of four mainstream Venezuelan opposition parties that includes Gauidó’s Voluntad Popular, has stated that they will not participate in the election.

The International Crisis Group, a think tank with analysts in Venezuela and an office in Bogotá, in neighbouring Colombia, has described the Supreme Court’s latest move on the CNE as an attempt by the Maduro government to regain control of the National Assembly. If successful, it would deprive Guaidó of the constitutional justification for his claims on the presidency. Equally, the regime may hope that the pardons convince opposition parties to participate in the elections, legitimising the poll in the eyes of foreign powers. But, with a March disapproval rating of 79%, the government is unlikely to win a democratic election. Additionally, Venezuela has not facilitated the visitation of EU election observers, a factor that undermines claims of democracy.

Alternatively, Maduro may hope that the pardons will exacerbate divisions within the G4 about whether to participate in the elections. On 2 August, Henrique Capriles, a former presidential candidate and the current leader of Primero Justicia (another party in the G4 coalition), called for opposition participation in the elections. This has undermined Guaidó’s demands that they be boycotted and adds to existing domestic and international doubts about the viability of his position, after hopes of regime change have failed to materialise.

What’s next?

Erika Guevara-Rosas, Americas Director at Amnesty International, has stated that the pardons should not be seen as ‘an act of benevolence, but a first step towards reparation’. Indeed, there are 330 individuals in Venezuelan jails that the opposition parties consider political prisoners.

If Maduro’s PSUV is successful in the December elections, this may weaken diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis in Venezuela. Alternatively, it may prompt external actors to support a compromise between the warring parties, rather than pursuing a strategy of ‘maximum pressure’, advocated by the USA and Guaidó, designed to force an increasingly unlikely regime change. So, August’s announcement does not signal a new commitment to democratic norms by the Maduro government, but there is still some hope that, with the right domestic and foreign support, Venezuela may find a route to democracy.