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The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) refers to the European Union’s general strategy for crisis management and threat mitigation abroad. This description alone might prompt scepticism regarding its merit as an impartial and transparent tool for the protection of human rights. Despite this, the CSDP’s civilian and military missions in conflict-ridden areas enjoy an excellent peacekeeping and peacebuilding record, often even outshining the United Nations’ best efforts. These endeavours, and the factors contributing to their successes, highlight the strength and future potential of the EU’s humanitarian approach.
Let us initially consider Operation Artemis (2003) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, one of the first ever humanitarian missions conducted as a result of the CSDP. It came about following the UN’s withdrawal of Ugandan peacekeepers from the Ituri region following the signing of a peacebuilding roadmap between local actors, which led to a resurgence in hostilities. Impeded by bureaucratic proceedings and financial constraints, the Security Council found itself unable to immediately redeploy a sizeable armed force. In response to pleas by the Secretary General, the EU quickly launched its peacekeeping mission into the country. The organisation put a swift end to the more intense bouts of urban violence and stabilised the region long enough for the UN to take over once more in the following months (1).
A similar, albeit more subdued, success of the CSDP is the ongoing Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Deployed in 2004 as a successor to NATO’s peacekeeping mission, the EU’s military and civilian force set out to further strengthen the government’s standing military and support local peacebuilding efforts. Through the former, the operation successfully limited the threat potential posed by sparse militias throughout the nation, and conclusively discouraged future aggression by former regional rivals. Peacebuilding, meanwhile, largely involved the creation of forums within the army to mitigate the ethnic tensions that characterised the nation’s civil conflict (2).
What do both case studies therefore have in common? Why did the EU commit to them in the way it did? The most significant reason is that addressing the instabilities of the DRC and Bosnia-Herzegovina heavily coincided with the organisation’s general foreign policy objectives. Indeed, both situations presented major security threats to the EU, whether because they risked creating environments that would enable the development of terrorist organisations or disrupted regional trading routes. Much like with any other international actor, it would have been within the organisation’s interests to address these issues before they evolved into larger problems. Whilst some may view the CSDP as a cynical Neo-conservative tool as a result, the fact that Europe’s interests coincide with humanitarian goals adequately justifies the organisation’s actions. The reality goes deeper than that, however. Indeed, the EU prides itself on being a ‘normative’ power, one that aims to cast its values on an international scale (3). This does not solely derive from moral convictions; rather the belief that instilling liberal democratic values onto societies facilitates future political and economic relations. Consequently, when organisations like the UN and NATO fall short, the EU will feel an instinctive drive to pick up the slack. It is thus a blend of pragmatic realism and idealistic liberalism that informs the CSDP, and that has driven Europe’s involvement in worthwhile causes.
There are certainly other factors that explain the EU’s humanitarian successes. Historically, European peacekeeping forces operating under the UN have tended to deploy far quicker than their African counterparts. This is thanks to better funded infrastructures and intelligence capabilities on top of more efficient bureaucracies, which were crucial to the EU’s quick response to the events taking place in the DRC. The CSDP also deliberately ensures that a standing army of at least 60,000 troops is always available, and ready to deploy within a maximum of 60 days (4). This focus on rapid reaction is a far cry from the UN, which gathers its peacekeepers on an operation-by-operation basis, a process which can take upwards of several months (5).
The strength of the CSDP also lies in the administrative capabilities of the EU. In Bosnia-Herzegovina for example, specialised civilian personnel would contribute to the military’s efforts to diminish aforementioned ethnic strife. They did so by reporting minority demographics’ grievances to judicial institutions like the European Court of Human Rights. Said personnel could, in turn, alter the future direction of the CSDP’s mission by reporting on these institutions’ rulings, thus creating a positive feedback loop of anti-discriminatory measures (2).
Whilst the Covid-19 pandemic highlighted notable deficiencies in the EU, the future of the CSDP itself looks relatively bright. Indeed, the policy has recently been supplemented by the introduction of the European Defence Fund and the establishment of proto-command structures like the Military Planning and Conduct Capabilities. Over time, these measures promise to not only significantly augment the scale of EU operations, but also their organisational strength on the field.
These developments, alongside the CSDP’s positive record, call for an increase in the institution’s involvement with multilateral humanitarian efforts. One such endeavour could include joint UN-EU peacekeeping operations in areas within Europe’s sphere of influence, most notably North Africa. This would have the potential to alleviate the financial burden that often undermines the effectiveness of solo missions conducted by the UN. In addition, it would ensure that field operations would be primarily conducted by better equipped, and often better trained European peacekeepers. Finally, and arguably most importantly, joint missions would be initiated significantly quicker thanks to the more efficient EU bureaucratic apparatus.
We live in a time when most discussion of human rights is relegated to toothless diplomatic condemnations and inconsequential grieving. Now more than ever, the world needs an efficient peacekeeping institution that can take decisive action. That institution is the EU, and the CSDP the framework that enables it to take said action. It only needs more refining and promotion by the West before it can achieve its full potential as a vehicle for humanitarianism.
Author: Niccolo Balducci
FURTHER READING
4)https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26326375.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Aab44315d32760a42e3dfc11fd32aa97e
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