The Future of Putin

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In January, it seemed that President Putin was preparing for his departure from the Kremlin in 2024. He proposed constitutional changes that would limit a president of Russia to serving two terms, along with other reforms which appeared to reduce presidential power. However, in March the belief that 2024 could see the end of Putin’s presidency abruptly disappeared. In what Foreign Policy described as a ‘cheesy act of melodrama’, Valentina Tereshkova, the first woman in space who now serves as a member of the Russian State Duma, proposed that if the clock were reset and Putin’s previous terms as president discounted, Putin would be able to remain in the Kremlin for two more terms, until 2036. She stated that this would be ‘a stabilising factor for our society’. An ‘all-people vote’ on this and other constitutional changes concluded on the first of July, having been delayed by the pandemic. The clause allowing Putin to remain in power was hidden amongst other reforms, including changes to pensions and the protection of marriage as the union between a woman and a man. Unsurprisingly, this was backed by nearly 78% of Russian voters, with all but one region approving the reforms. But does this apparent popularity reflect the present situation in Russia when considering Putin’s handling of Covid-19? 

Despite Russia’s centralised government, Putin shifted much of the decision-making relating to Covid-19 to regional leaders, and retreated from the public eye as the pandemic intensified. Russia’s strategy for economic recovery and aid was deemed insufficient by many workers in private firms who were left without support. Propaganda appears to have been the main tool of the government during the pandemic. Sending medical supplies to the USA in April was a clear publicity stunt- done despite the difficult situation in Russia at the time, exemplified by an emergency hospital that was being built in Moscow. Propaganda was also an important tool prior to Covid-19 arriving in Russia. The Economist shows that many Russians were led to believe that the virus was an American invention used to harm China, mirroring President Trump’s assertion of Chinese involvement. However, at a time when Russians are increasingly using social media and online sources for their news, Putin’s publicity machine no longer has the impact that it once had. People are also turning to the opposition leader, Alexei Navalny, for news. He exposes the misinformation surrounding Russia’s handling of the crisis and in the lead up to the ‘all-people vote’, denounced the claims that Putin remaining in the Kremlin would be necessary for stability. One of Navalny’s YouTube videos which responds to the prospect of Putin being in power for two further terms has nearly three million views. 

The opening of the Demikhov city clinical hospital No. 68. Image taken from The Moscow Times.

The reporting of Covid-19 deaths has also been understated due to disinformation. Investigations by the Financial Times found that, despite the death rate being significantly higher in Moscow in April when compared to previous years, official reports indicated that only 629 of these deaths were a result of the novel coronavirus. The low death rate reported by Russia has been widely questioned, and recent changes made to April’s Covid-19 death statistics in Moscow highlight the government’s attempts to manipulate public opinion about its response to Covid-19. In an interview with CNN, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov attempted to improve the government’s position by asserting that the low number of deaths could be explained by the effective health system and the high level of testing in Russia.

Putin’s management of the crisis combined with his proposals to stay in power until 2036 have led to tumbling approval ratings. The independent Levada-Center shows that the approval rating of 68% in January fell to 59% in April, the lowest seen since Putin became president. This exacerbated the decline that started in 2018, due to unpopular pension reforms and a faltering economy.

Putin wearing a hazmat suit to visit a hospital. Image taken from an ABC News article ‘Putin dons hazmat suit, as Russia admits virus numbers likely far higher’.

Visible acts of resistance to his reforms were seen when they were announced in March, including an open letter signed by lawyers and journalists opposing the changes. Following the 2011 election which led to Putin’s return to the Kremlin after serving a term as Prime Minister, there were widespread protests. At this time, Putin’s approval ratings had fallen to 65%, but they recovered in following years. Despite not being on the scale of the 2011 protests, demonstrations have been occurring recently in the aftermath of July’s vote, although not in the usual locations of Moscow and St Petersburg. There have been protests attracting tens of thousands of people in the eastern city of Khabarovsk following the arrest of the governor of the region, who was elected two years ago, defeating Putin’s preferred candidate. These protests are significant, as they carry a clear anti-Putin message. Anti-Putin protests in the past have mainly been centred in Moscow and St Petersburg, showing how support for Putin in the provinces should not be assumed to be unyielding.

The prospect of a further 12 years of Putin in the Kremlin after 2024 is now realistic, despite the illegitimacy of July’s vote, which was not independently monitored. The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights has shown that all observed elections in Russia since 2000 have not conformed to democratic standards, thus July’s ‘All-People Vote’ conforms to Russia’s ‘democratic’ traditions. Although Putin’s approval ratings have declined, they are still higher than most world leaders could expect whilst a poorly managed pandemic continues to damage their country. The results of the ‘all-people vote’ may have been manufactured, but Putin’s approval ratings and the lack of a sustained protest movement show a truth that cannot be ignored: a generation has grown up under Putin’s leadership, and he remains a figure that many Russians cannot see their country without.